

Roundtable transcript

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Title: Empirical Cases, Directions and Choices of Foreign Policy in the Cold War

Chair: Roham Alvandi (RA)

Arne Westad (AW)

Federico Romero (FR)

Rinna Kullaa (RK)

Lorenz Lüthi (LL)

Wolfgang Mueller (WM)

RA: Welcome everyone, my name is Roham Alvandi and I'm an Associate Professor here at the LSE in international history and I also direct the Cold War Studies Project at the LSE Ideas and I'm very happy to be able to chair this round table which brings together, I think **it's fair to say, the all-star cast, the heavy hitters of Cold War history**. [...] Very briefly I will introduce the panelists. The purpose of this panel is to, as I understand it, to take the broad view, to zoom out, and take the 5000-6000 -foot view of the Cold War and the people assembled here are the best do that. So, Luc-Andre Brunet and Rinna Kullaa who have directed me on this have come up with a couple of questions that will direct the discussion. I will pose two questions to panelists for this round table.

The first is: **How global is was the Cold War? So, in other words was there a geographical center to the Cold War, and did that center shift over time?** And the second question is: **What were, because this is a conference focusing on smaller states, what were the preferable instruments for small states and non-state actors for exerting influence during the Cold War?**

Joining us from Yale University is **Arne Westad**, my former colleague here at the LSE, who is now the Elihu Professor of History at Yale, and I'm happy to say for this year at least he's back here at the LSE Ideas. Unfortunately, due to COVID it's ruined all our plans of any kind with Arne, but we're very pleased to have him here at this panel. Alongside him we have **Federico Romero** who many of you will know. He is the professor of history of post-war European co-operation and integration at the European University Institute in Florence. **Rinna Kullaa** who is an Associate Professor in Global

History at Tampere University, she works in global history and international relations and EU's foreign and security policy. Joining us from Montreal is **Lorenz Lüthi**, Associate Professor at McGill University, who's just published a magisterial history of the Cold War. And **Wolfgang Mueller** is also joining us from Vienna, he's a professor of Russian history at the University of Vienna and the Deputy Head of the Institute for East European History.

So, this is quite a treat to have all of these scholars with us. I've asked each of them to make a five-to-seven-minute introductory intervention, and then we will open the discussion up for a more free flowing discussion. If it is all right, can I ask **Arne** you to kick off.

AW: Good to see all of you! Good afternoon to people in Europe and morning to people over here (in the US). It is wonderful to be with a group of old friends. It would have been much more joyous if we could have done this in person but there will be a time hopefully when that will be possible and not in that faraway future as well. I'm just going to be very brief as Roham instructed to begin with today. I think the best way of spending this hour or so is to think about getting a discussion going because these are important questions as I'm sure you will have seen from the rest of the conference as well. I'm going to address very briefly the first of these questions in the opening and get back to some of the rest of it in the discussion. So, how idea of global the cold war was as Roham put it is a very important question. *Not because of a kind of delineation, I mean I think people have to make up their own mind about what makes sense to them as I've argued before in terms of definitions, in terms of periodization, in terms of interpretation – what matters more than other things. I do think it's very important to get to the point where we are able to discuss origins, connections, cohesions beyond the whole war imposed binary.*

There is a timeline that the conflict in a way created itself and which is set out in the historiography of the Cold War as it was researched and taught, I would say to the middle or the late 1990s. And that was about an origin in Europe in the late 1940s and then a high point in the 50s and 60s of the Cuban Missile Crisis and then a gradual descent to a some kind of normality in terms of interactions, certainly at the state level and the diplomatic level from the 60s and to the end of the Cold War. In 1989 according to some people and in 1991 the collapse of the Soviet Union according to some others. Baked into that discussion is because I challenge with regard to which geographical regions, how global was the Cold War throughout this period. What I've argued in my most recent work of the Cold War, my last work on the Cold War, is that there was a gradual globalization of the

war in ideological terms but also in terms of the connections that were created among social movements and states during the 20th century.

For me in many ways, the chronological aspect of this is more important than the geographical. I think situating the Cold War, the Cold War's origins in a deep ideological conflict that starts in Europe and in North America in the late 19th century and in some ways goes on even today, certainly from the US perspective it can be argued that it does, and then goes on to become an international system in the mid-20th century and then stops being an international system at the end of the Soviet Union. So that's how I see it. It is critical to me to insist on the global aspects of this. So even though there is much to be said, particularly in ideological terms for European origins to the Cold War. I don't think that is how the conflict developed. And part of the reason for that is that I'm very eager to return agency to the anticolonial, anti-imperial space in terms of the development of Cold War ideologies in the early part of the 20th century. I mean Lorenz has shown this brilliantly in his last book, all the contradictions and conflicts and problems that are there analytically with regard to this. So, as Lorenz quite correctly says one has to be very careful with subsuming everything else that happens in the 20th century or even the late 20th century. What is clear to me is that the Cold War influenced a lot of these developments and merged with them. I don't think for instance that decolonization would have taken place the way it did without the Cold War. It is also quite possible that the Cold War would not have developed the way it did at the state level up to the 1970s and the 1980s if it hadn't been for the rebellion against colonial regimes and the setting up of the postcolonial states.

That is just an overview of on how I see this. It is complicated, this is not an either-or kind of a question. But I think that in all this complexity it's still worth to look at it, particularly for teaching purposes. So, that students who haven't experienced the Cold War or the immediate aftermath get an idea of how complex, how problematic these issues were. But also, how it was possible for something that is in its essence very negative, as the Cold War was, to spread globally the way it did. So that's what I have to say as a starting point.

RA: Thank you very much Arne, I think that sets us up very well for the discussion. I think you have touched on all the important things.

I'll move ahead in the same order as I introduced the speakers, so could I ask **Federico Romero** to speak.

FR: Well, I am sort of on the record for writing that the Cold War had and maintained a center of gravity in Europe, and I have not changed my ideas in this respect. I still think that is relevant. But,

there is no doubt that the Cold War becomes a global phenomenon even though with a both timeline and both geography that is very irregular, fragmented, far from linear. I also agree with representation that Lorenz gave in his last book about non-regional conflicts that we might label as Cold War conflicts even though they were rarely called that sort of ebb and flow and eventually are transformed into something that is increasingly difficult to define as Cold War.

Having said that, I think the global dimension of the Cold War, *it quite depends on how we define the Cold War to begin with.* (a) *Whether we are referring to an international system and therefore a system led by bipolar tension as well as coexistence and arrangement.* (b) *Whether we define it as a worldview, a representation, in which case the Cold War might be different and assessed differently.* (c) *Whether we look at it as the lens through which governments, diplomats, statesmen, commentators, intellectuals framed their understanding of their world. And in that sense, I think we could also go a bit deeper probably, that would be useful in breaking the assumed symmetry of the bipolar system into an assumption of an equally symmetric world view.*

I think we have to recall, *that the Cold War is essentially an American understanding that of a western understanding of history of that moment; that the Soviets and the socialist world had a notion of a sort of permanent international class struggle which was as an extension curtailed with the notion of the Cold War, and it was inherently different.* So, once we start to differentiate this, it seems to me, that *the issue of the global reach inevitably breaks down into different segments, different components that have to be analyzed separately.* Even though, maintaining the notions that *the Cold War obviously had global influences and was influenced by global phenomenon of the example that Arne just made about the process of decolonization and the Cold War, and the mutual the influences is the main one, but it is not the only one.* And I agree with him on that point entirely.

So, in a way, *the issue is also to separate at least analytically these various grounds.* We know for instance *the big corpus of literature that is constantly expanding about the Latin American Cold War. And the Latin American Cold War is not a front of global Cold War ran by the superpowers or by the blocs. It is a Latin American phenomenon,* that is sometimes cold and sometimes not as cold war that interacts with the global Cold War, *but has dynamics of it's own rooted in domestic conflicts even in the level of representations for instance on the fight around issues of communism and anti-communism as a domestic or internal or regional dimension that is not entirely coincidental overlapping with the global Cold War.*

So again, *I think we have to get used to specifying which understanding over the Cold War we refer to in our works; Which is the dimension of the Cold War we refer to in our works when*

we are speaking about the topic; And how differences affect different theatres of the war in the moment we are examining it. Considering also the fact even further, a very big complication, a very interesting challenge, but also very big complications is that by globalizing the Cold War both as an international system in its outreach is a way to frame the challenges ahead, and the tension in world politics is a phenomenon that goes together sometimes very closely together, sometimes very loosely together with the set of phenomena trends that we define as globalization, which are not the same thing with Cold War and the global Cold War. That is to say, to what extent we come to understand the Cold War as a globalizing in its dynamic also because it goes together with trends towards the globalization of trade, of finance, of cultural exchanges, of exchanges of people that have little to do with the Cold War itself, that are sometimes constrained or propelled by Cold War geographies.

It's obvious that the globalization of trade and finance for instance moves, not entirely but largely around the socialist world, rather than through the socialist world, not as intensively as it does on other areas of the world. But this globalization of trade and financing, banking culture and information etcetera, transform the playfield in which the Cold War takes place and globalizes de facto, even though the origins of the phenomenon, the trends of the phenomenon are entirely different and largely separate from Cold War politics per se but not completely independent again because of the flows of globalization are also channeled by the walls, separations the borders that the Cold War as an international system poses on global society.

So, I think that the plea at the end is for assuming a more conceptually precise definition of which Cold War we are talking about when we are writing about Cold War and to derive from that an assessment of whether that type of Cold War, that angle on the Cold War stresses the global, the regional, the local and the mutual influences of these various dimensions. Otherwise, we maintain a level of generality and vagueness which is not very useful. It seems to me we were moving towards that through a set of books that were made by as mentioned by Arne and Lorenz, that are probably a milestone in this road towards a better understanding and better definitions but there is a lot more work to be done. The papers that we heard this morning are pointing in that direction in many interesting ways. There was a paper for instance about relationship between Switzerland and Singapore, where's the Cold War there, but the globalization is definitely there, and somewhat relates also to Cold War politics at a different level. I'll stop there at the moment.

RA: Thank you very much Federico. I'm amazed how much ground you can cover in such short period, that's very impressive. I will now move on to **Rinna Kullaa**.

RK: Thank you Roham. So, maybe I could dovetail from what Federico said. If I could then be very concrete, I'm from Finland, and Finland is a state that in the Cold War had at least 860 miles of border with the Soviet Union. So, in my classes I almost always ask my students the question: How does the Finnish president wake up every morning? And the answer is: he wakes up every morning with this great big border with the Soviet Union. And after the Cold War our current president Sauli Niinistö still wakes up with this border with Russia every day. And so, I think that the influence of superpowers in the Cold War and the concreteness of power politics cannot be forgotten by someone who is looking at the conflict from a concrete point of view of Finland or Northern Europe or Scandinavia. However, our workshop is about alternatives, and I would like to suggest to the panel an alternative view to think about the centers of the Cold War and the manners how it was global.

Lately I've been working on a little theory that I have, a hypothesis and I have some documents from the UN archives in Geneva from which my thoughts begun from. *In this hypothesis I have fixated on looking at the Cold War from the years 1959 and 1989.* And in this little theory of mine 1959 chosen because it is the year when the *UN secretary general Dag Hammarskjöld sends a Finnish diplomat, a Finnish economist, who's based at Geneva for the UN economic commission for Europe. He sends him to Laos to do and invent development politics. He also picks some other scientists, sociologists, for example Gunnar Myrdal, he sends them to different missions. And so, my geographic center for the year 1959, for the Cold War in the Scandinavian perspective could be this global network, that these people are from Northern Europe but they are also engaged in UN institutions in New York and Geneva, and they are a different group of actors, kind of an network. All of them are kind of an elite, the sons of the elite, but not from the big political parties in Scandinavia, and in fact they are not politicians. They are economists and sociologists and compose an alternative vision in Cold War and development politics.* Under Hammarskjöld they are sent to start and establish different UN missions that have to do with decolonization. And in this model of mine, I experiment and think about the Cold War as a conflict and a place where also ideas and influences travelled. Like in a network that is not so stable. I think about the travel of knowledge, and that kind of moment in the Cold War. That is a particularly Scandinavian perspective, but it is a moment in history where the UN secretary general literally forces some of these Nordic sociologists and economists to conduct world politics, whether they want to or not. Sakari Tuomioja who is sent from Geneva does not particularly want to go to Laos. Not because he's not a worldly man, but he does not see how to direct both at the same time, the UN economic commission group in Geneva from Laos in 1959, he does not see it as possible. And Hammarskjöld forces him to.

That's one of the network moments of the Cold War, whereas then I think in 1989 for me the center of the Cold War, in the 1980s actually, after 1985, absolutely shifts to Eastern Europe and to Moscow. That's where to me the decisions are made to dismantle. I often think about my classroom for example for this week I talked in my classroom about Russia in the Middle East, about the fact that how phenomenal it was, the way that the Soviet Union dissolved without spreading nuclear weapons. This way it was controlled, it was not a failure necessarily. You don't have to look at it as a failure, you can see it as a controlled process. And this is not to deny great power politics or influences, *I just think that the way we define the Cold War, and how we should define it depends on the shifting perspective on where you are looking at it from.* And some of the other perspectives might be interesting, I mean Arne is from Norway, and I am from Finland, and both of our states have a particular relationship to Sweden as a neighboring country. So, it creates a different kind of view, let's put it that way. In any case, I won't talk any longer than that.

That's my little theory or answer on how I would answer these questions. And I just also wanted to bring up the 1980s because as Arne said most of our students today don't know the Cold War. I of course remember it, I was a child, I had been to Moscow, I had been to Cuba in 1987 and I have a very vivid memory of that. And I have found out this week in my classroom that most of my students interpret the 1980s as a very bleak era. But, I have to say I don't really remember it as sad, I remember the airplanes, I remember how the Soviet Union smelled terrible because of some detergent for example, and that there were often no vegetables. But even the negative aspects do not make me remember it as a very negative era to me. After all then, I didn't know anything that could be so much better. I remember my parents thinking about, not spitefully about the Soviet Union, but thinking about that life without freedom is very sad. And I agree with Arne, that at least in my work *I should try to transmit these pictures (of the 1980s) to the students so they could better understand at least that I had that experience of the era. It sometimes looked and felt quite different that it seems on paper on decisions of power politics.* Thank you so much.

RA: Thank you so much Rinna. *I still remember the first year when I was teaching when I didn't have a single student who weren't born during the Cold War, it was an absolutely terrifying moment there.* So, let us now move to **Lorenz Lüthi** please.

LL: Well, thank you for inviting me, welcome to everybody. I am also a child of the Cold War, I grew up in Switzerland in the 70s and the 80s, so of course I have my own memories, actually bleak.

I grew up in a part of the family branch who speaks Germany so there was some bleakness there, but it was Switzerland, it was a safe place.

Let me just return to *the question on how global was the Cold War and the question of the center. I repeat what Arne and Federico have said, I don't think the Cold War is the only paradigm to explain 20th century international affairs. Nation-state building, economic globalization mostly in the 1970s, mostly financial I think, technological revolutions of course since the 1970s.* If we define Cold War as a conflict pitting communism against capitalism and the basic symbol is the Soviet Union against the United States. Then we can talk about *a kind of geographical expansion of the Cold War until I would say the late 60s maybe the early 70s. The story would be that in the late 40s the Cold War would be confined into Europe and East Asia, maybe into Iran and Turkey, the Korean War, the nature impact on globalization along the periphery of the Asian continent in the 1950s. Decolonization brought Africa into the picture, Latin America in the 1960s as Latin American developments baked in to the 19th century start to interject in this action, the global Cold War.*

I would probably think that 1970, the period around the 70s, as sort of the high point of geographic extension. The retreat from the Middle East and East Asia in the 1970s and then a powerless collapse of the Cold War in the 80s, that's the story I want to tell. However, we should keep in mind the intensity of the Cold War is really different in different regions. In some regions, it is extremely intense and in others it's barely there. *People in India might have experienced the Cold War fundamentally different from people in East Berlin,* we have to keep that in mind. If you talk about centers, it depends on how you define what the center is of course. Well, it depends on how we define the Cold War. We have talked about *if you define it as a revolution, a challenge against the existing world system, then I would say the center, those places of ideological conflict are the most intense. It would be definitely East Asia, China, Vietnam since actually the 1920s, really actually the Chinese Civil War is the first Cold War conflict and it starts in the late 1920s.* But also, there's also Cuba, that's not out of our depth in my mind, then it reaches from these regions to the rest of the world. The rest of the world really are secondary theatres, they derive their importance from these centers.

How do smaller states interact is a topic of this conference, I think it varies on strategies, the geography of these smaller actors, if they are on the frontlines, *they have various instruments to blackmail their superpower hegemons.* In other cases *they can use ideological radicalism,* Chinese Communism, Maoism, think also of certain of the Palestinians. They can use peace diplomacy for example, Algeria did this until 1962, the Vietnamese after 1968, *this is often used to hide a revolutionary agenda.* *Or they can use collaboration,* there are couple of papers in this conference

that actually talk about that. But let's think about that systematically also, you have the Non-aligned Movement, tricontinentalism, various forms of Pan-Islamism, Pan-Arabism, the European Communities that co-operated very closely during these CSCE processes. They were central to bringing human rights agenda to these actors in these conferences, the big legacy of the CSCE. This collaborative project really, we should look at them much more closely. How they would interact with each other, we have to explore actually these non-superpower actors much better. We are still much too focused on the big powers at the moment. I think the agenda for future generations of Cold War historians is to look at the smaller powers, the often have this proportional influence of the cause of the Cold War. I think that is what I wanted to say today.

RA: Thank you very much Lorenz. I wholeheartedly agree with you, we have discussed this in other forms as well. We can come back to this maybe, so. Can I now invite **Wolfgang Mueller** to join our conversation from Vienna.

WM: Thank you very much and thanks to all of you for these wonderful statements. I think I agree with most of what has been said. My impression from teaching the Cold War in universities and also from reading the current production of Cold War research, it leads to two conclusions. The first is that many members of the younger generations of students tend to see the Cold War today as a game of either of two equally selfish superpowers, that had nothing to do with smaller states and nothing to do with the world in general or on the other hand some see the Cold War as a historic period like any others, so as some sort of a framework and from which anything and any development of international relations can be subsumed, I think what has been already touched upon by Federico. So I think that the question of how global the Cold War and why it was global is particularly important and most of us will agree that it potentially viable conflict from the Bolsheviks rise to power in 1917 and a conflict that became truly global from the 1950s as Arne and his wonderful work and also most recently Lorenz reminded us.

Why is the Cold War global? I think that relates first to its content, it is the depreciation of the existing international order, of the existing political order by the Bolshevik regime in Soviet Russia. So, it is the claim to undo whatever is there what makes the Cold War ideologically a global phenomenon from its very beginning. And the second reason why it becomes global and why it's potentially global from the beginning also has something to do with actors. It's no small state that claims to undo the international order, it is 15 % of the global land mass as Soviet propaganda consistently reminded us, 1/6th of the earth. And on the other end when we look at the main opponent after World War 2 it's also not some state or another, it's the leading nuclear power and the country that produces about 40 % of the global industrial production of the world. So already from these two parameters, the

content on other hand the actors on the other, *it becomes clear that the conflict is potentially global from the beginning, so right on from 1917 and then becomes global from the 1950s onward.* Then it shifts, I think what has been beautifully elaborated by Arne and by Lorenz and I'm also very much with what Rinna and Federico have said in that regard. What I want to say perhaps *in addition is that we need to keep in mind the role of Soviet Russia and the USSR.* As I tried to explain, *I think it's the USSR that becomes the geographic point origin of the Cold War, it's the epicenter of the Cold War.* So, *I think it would make sense to look at the Cold War also through the prism of the ability of Soviet Russia and the USSR to project power globally.*

And there we see that how far the Bolsheviks are able to project their power, that far the Cold War goes, or there the Cold War emerges. *And I'm very much with what Lorenz said in regards the Chinese Civil War, but then we also need to think about the Russian Civil War. So we are back into Russia again, and then we move into Mongolia, then we move after World War 2 into Eastern Europe and into the Balkans, then we move into Korea and so on. Wherever the USSR is able to project it's power, there very quickly the Cold War follows. We see this from the 1950s and the 1960s onwards. Then we have Cuba then we have the Kongo and you name it all in Vietnam and so forth.* It would make sense to see it through that prism, so whenever I write a book about the Cold War that would be my main argument.

Just two sentences about smaller states, and here I also agree with what Lorenz and Rinna and Federico have said. I think we need to first define a basic difference, and this is a small state a part of a larger, either an alliance or that is ready to ally itself with one of the superpowers, then this small state can very quickly become a new hotspot by making a superpower send weapons and to get involved and so on. If it's a small state that has made the decision to stay independent, then it looks entirely different and then we very often witness strategies of raising or upgrading the visibility of this particular, very often neutral state through good offices, diplomacy, cultural self-depiction and other non-violent means. But this is certainly no rule and for non-state actors, we have not talked very much about them, although they were also covered by one of the questions. For non-state actors I think we should also have to look at them separately because they behave differently. Thank you I leave it with that.

RA: Thank you very much Wolfgang. So we have about 10 minutes or so left, and we have a question from Hugh Dawson on Sukarno in Indonesia and how important sidelining of Sukarno and the mass killing that followed were. But, if I could use that question as a sort of starting off point, can I ask

any of you to reflect on how does the periodization of the Cold War change if we look at it as a truly global conflict and not just as a US-Soviet confrontation in Europe? What are the crucial moments or the turning points like for example the fall of Sukarno that you would point to and say look, that's where future historians should look. I personally think that 1979, from my own biases and there are a lot of books that have come out looking at 1979 for a variety of reasons. But I'm just curious, are there in the course of your work, is there a new periodization of the Cold War that you think we should look at if we look at the Cold War globally?

***RK:** Well, my periodization starts from later, from 1959 and into the 60s, because I think of the Cold War sometimes from a more of a transformation perspective, a longer period of decolonization and like this. But on the other hand then in my classroom I have found that after I've started adding the Arab Spring, the Lebanese Civil War, the focus on the Levant has also shifted to the years of the Lebanese Civil War for a different rationality, because I think the whole Levant becomes the spotlight.*

***AW:** I agree with that. I think it is important that when you teach this stuff to get students to realize that chronology, whatever way you set it up, is intimately connected to interpretation. What you want to say defines which years you highlight. It's certainly been the way for me. As I argued back on the global Cold War, Indonesia is very important, it's important in a regional setting obviously, but it's also important as it has been pointed out recently in a global setting in a sense that it starts the period of very severe setbacks for what you could call the Third Worldist -approach to dealing with global Cold War problems.*

*So, some of you will remember the way I define this is by looking at Third Worldism as a relatively brief high point that broke from the Bandung in the mid-1950s and up to the Indonesian coup and the massacres that followed. It does not end there, it has an afterlife as you all know that goes on, and maybe here a post-Cold War transformation as well in terms of global south connections. But that's the high point, you know my conclusion on why that is the case are the forces that are put in against that project. I mean mainly by the United States and its allies. But also the difficulties that the Soviet Union and its allies with accepting something, **this goes back to Rinna's point actually, that could be an alternative way outside of Cold War dichotomies.** You know to look at some of this. This goes on to some of the discussion we've been having already, I mean in terms of dualism and bipolarities. So I agree that one has to be very careful with putting those at the center, and in a way the last book I did on this was a way to break old doctrines and framework. But one also must be very careful with underestimating the need that so many people felt across the globe of breaking out from*

what they saw as an entrenched bipolar system. So if you think about perceptions, I do think this is actually quite important here, on a global scale that even in places where the Cold War wasn't as tangible, wasn't as clear in people's daily lives, there was a relationship to what was seen as an established ideological void, and after 1941 an international system, that everyone felt that they needed to have some kind of relationship. And sometimes when they knew it, as Lorenz points out in his book, they ignored it, because it could come back and hurt them if they wanted themselves to break free of the Cold War dichotomies. So that goes to what Wolfgang was saying as well actually, you ignore international systems that you peril, when they are at their height.

LL: Let me jump in here, I want to make *three points as going back to Rinna and what she just mentioned on the Middle East and the Soviet Union.* I think some very early turning points, *I think 1967 definitely for me, looking at Western Europe, the merchant treaty of the European Communities,* that as a first time comes as a shock to the Soviets, because they realize that they might be frozen out of the global economy. *1973, Egypt turning away,* that's a trauma that shows up in documents later, Afghanistan are pulling an Egypt on us, India are pulling an Egypt on us, that's sort of the trauma that repeats in 1979 and in the 80s when they look actually to the third world. In the Middle East I would look at the 60s, you know first Iran, with the rise of Khomeini as a position seeker, but definitely 1967-69 with the rise of Islam in the Arabic World and in both cases these are movements that come to fruition later but they very clearly already have this idea of let's transcend the Cold War, this paradigm of the bipolarity, let's just get rid of it. That's sort of very relevant to the world now. In East Asia to come back to Indonesia, I agree with what Arne just said, it's one of the first major setbacks to third worldism. But I want to see really Vietnam and China as breaking point in the 70s, collapse of this Sino-Vietnamese revolutionary alliance and then they turn against each other. Really to a certain degree it just undermines the authority of the communist project in Asia.

The End.